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NOTES 
FOREIGN SALES CORPORATIONS: A VIABLE 
SOLUTION TO THE DISC CONTROVERSY? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Foreign Sales Corporation Act of 1983 (FSC)1 was intro-
duced in Congress on August 4, 1983 as a replacement for the 
embattled ten year old tax export aid, the Domestic International 
Sales Corporation (DISC).2 Given the criticism which has plagued 
DISC since its inception in 1971, this year's enactment of FSC is 
indeed a welcome change. However, as a solution to the DISC con-
troversy under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT),3 or as a comparable incentive to DISC, FSC is arguably 
somewhat lacking. 
1. The Foreign Sales Corporation Act of 1983, H.R. 3810, was originally introduced 
in the House of Messers. Rostenkowski and Conable on August 4, 1983. H.R. 3810, 98th Cong., 
1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. H6606 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1983). An identical Senate bill, S. 1804, was 
introduced the same day by Senator Dole. S. 1804, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. 
S11762 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1983 pt. II). Neither version received consideration during the 98th 
Congress 1st session. On March 21, 1984, however, FSC was reported out of the Senate 
Committee on Finance as a part of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, H.R. 4170. See Sum-
mary of Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, reprinted in 23 TAX NOTES (CCH) No. 2, at 178 (Apr. 
9, 1984). Although not made a part of the House tax act, FSC was passed by the Senate 
on May 17, 1984. 130 CONG. REC. S5973 (daily ed. May 17, 1984). In conference, FSC was adopted 
by both Senate and House conferees on Saturday, June 23, 1984, and the Conference Report 
was passed by both houses on June 27, 1984. 130 CONG. REC. D902, D905 (daily ed. June 27, 
1984). President Reagan signed the tax bill into law on July 18, 1984. 20 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. 
Doc. 1037 (July 23, 1984). 
2. A Domestic International Sales Corporation is a tax incentive to export. See 26 
U.S.C. §§ 991-997 (1982). As a long term direct tax deferral, DISC works by lowering the 
effective tax rate on export transactions. In 1976, the DISC provisions were challenged and 
found incompatible with the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT), done Oct. 
30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3 (1947), T.l.A.S. No. 1700, 55-61 U.N.T.S. 194 (1948). See Report of the 
GATT Panel, United States Tax Legislation (DISC), GATT DOC L./4422 (2 Nov. 1976), 
reprinted in 23 BISD 98 (1975-76). 
3. GATT, supra note 2. The concern in the debate over DISC compliance with GATT 
centered on whether DISC violated GATT article XVI on subsidies. GATT, supra note 2, 
at A51, as then interpreted by the Working Party Report on Subsidies. See Report on Sub-
sidies, Provisions of article XVI:4, reprinted in 9 BISD 185 (1961). The EC alleged that DISC 
was a "remission of direct taxes, ... calculated in relation to exports" that was specifically 
defined as a subsidy under items (c) and (d) of the Working Party Report. Report on Sub-
sidies, 9 BISD at 186-187. The United States argued DISC was not an exemption or remis-
sion, but rather only a deferral and therefore GATT legal. In relation to FSC, then, one 
issue is whether FSC is a subsidy under the now official Subsidies Code, the successor to 
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Under. certain circumstances, to be discussed, FSC may con-
form to the legal standards of GATT.4 These circumstances, 
however, are not the majority of cases. Perhaps even more 
troublesome is that Congressional approval of FSC publicly signifies 
a retreat from longstanding U.S. efforts to combat the trade dis-
torting tax practices of the European Community (EC).5 Not only 
does FSC concede the direct-indirect exemption conflict to Euro-
pean logic,6 but it represents a unilateral effort at enforced arm's-
length pricing currently unmatched in the EC.7 
As an export incentive to producers, FSC offers a net level 
of benefit lower than that under DISC8 with more inherently costly 
requirements.9 Because of this added cost, the proposal may well 
be out of reach of many of the businesses it was intended to aid.10 
Moreover, with such low or negative levels of would-be benefits 
the Working Party Report. See GATT: Agreement on Interpretation of Articles VI, XVI 
and XXIII, done, Apr. 12, 1979 (1979) 1 U.S.T. 573, T.l.A.S. No. 9619, reprinted in 26 BISD 
56 (1979) [hereinafter cited to BISD]. For reasons discussed herein, FSC has the potential 
to be a subsidy. See infra text accompanying notes 163-85a. 
4. See infra text accompanying notes 163-85a. Under the model derived in footnotes 
17 4-84, for FSC to be consistent with the GA TT foreign economic processes exemption, see 
infra text accompanying notes 87-88, it would have to be assumed that the disposition and 
overhead costs incurred by an FSC represented 64% of the export price of the product. 
Clearly, if the FSC does not produce the product itself, but rather must purchase it at arm's-
length from its parent, a mere 36% of the export price being allocable to the product itself 
is somewhat unrealistic. Moreover, given the "watered down" foreign process and presence 
requirements under the FSC proposal, it is equally unrealistic that the costs for these 
processes would amount to 64% of the export selling price. However, these are the assump-
tions arguably made by the drafters of H.R. 3810. 
5. Reference is made to the longstanding U.S. policy of promoting free, undistorted 
trade patterns based on comparative advantage. FSC arguably does not further this policy 
because of its questionable GATT legality. Moreover, FSC represents both an abandonment 
of the U.S. fight to win recognition of indirect tax exemptions as trade distorting practices 
within the meaning of the GATT, as well as a move toward arm's-length transfer pricing 
which is currently unmatched in Europe. Thus, not only do indirect exemptions remain GATT 
legal, but EC transfer price rules have yet to match U.S. arm's-length standards-both trade 
distorting results. See infra text accompanying notes 208-32. 
6. See supra note 4 and infra text accompanying notes 208-32. 
7. See supra note 4 and infra text accompanying notes 73-86. 
8. While DISC and FSC, in the large exporter case, offer the same level of tax benefit, 
with the costly foreign presence and process requirements of FSC, the net level of benefit 
under FSC is lower. See infra text accompanying notes 232-47. 
9. These more costly requirements are called the foreign presence and foreign 
economic processes requirements. See infra text accompanying notes 109-25. 
10. This conclusion is drawn from the fact that because the effective level of tax benefit 
is lower under FSC than under DISC, those firms operating at the margin under DISC would 
find it too costly to continue to produce in the United States and export through a foreign 
subsidiary. See infra text accompanying notes 242-47. 
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in some cases, FSC may be a force in granting marginal DISC users 
an incentive to once again invest and produce abroad.11 
FSC may buy a short term peace with the EC in the GA TT 
Council. The long run effect, however, is a net disadvantage to U.S. 
exporters in relation to their European counterparts and a further 
entrenchment of the trade distorting practices of the EC's own tax 
export aids. It appears, therefore, that while United States' efforts 
may be commendable, there is something indeed ironic about call-
ing FSC a real "solution" to anything. 
An analysis of the arguments presented above is the subject 
of this Note. Section II will deal with the DISC legislation, its 
technical and theoretical description, and the history of the DISC 
controversy within GATT.11a Particular emphasis will be placed on 
the justification for DISC the United States offered and then aban-
doned before the GA TT CounciI.11h Section III will deal with the FSC 
Proposal.11c Section IV is an analysis ofFSC legality under GATT and 
its acceptability to business as an alternative incentive to DISC.11d 
II. DOMESTIC INTERNATIONAL SALES CORPORATIONS 
A. A TECHNICAL/THEORETICAL DESCRIPTION 
A Domestic International Sales Corporation (DISC) is an 
exporting firm located in the United States that is exempt from 
federal income taxation.12 Enacted as a part of the Revenue Act 
of 1971,13 DISC is designed to give parent corporations with DISC 
subsidiaries a lower effective tax rate on the export income from 
domestically produced goods.14 The purpose of the lower rate is to 
11. Reference is made to one of the policies for which DISC was created: to keep taxes 
from creating an incentive to produce goods for foreign markets in foreign countries rather 
than in the United States. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 98TH CONG., lsT 
SESS., REPLACEMENT OF DOMESTIC INTERNATIONAL SALES CORPORATIONS (DISCs)-DESCRIPTION 
OF s. 1804 (FOREIGN SALES CORPORATION ACT) 34 (J. Comm. Print 1983) [hereinafter cited as 
Joint Committee Print]. Whereas FSC does not provide the same net level of benefit as 
DISC, those firms at the margin will find a net advantage in producing abroad rather than 
in the United States. 
lla. See infra notes 12-100 and accompanying text. 
llb. See infra notes 73-86 and accompanying text. 
llc. See infra notes 101-62 and accompanying text. 
lld. See infra notes 163-263 and accompanying text. 
12. 26 u.s.c. §§ 991-92 (1982). 
13. The Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, Title V, § 501, 85 Stat. 535 (1971). 
14. Joint Committee Print, supra note 11, at 9. 
The lower effective tax rate on the export income earned through DISCs is based on 
the assumption of permanent DISC deferral. If, for instance, all deferred income needed 
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counter existing corporate tax incentives for producing abroad such 
as paying no U.S. tax until the foreign income is repatriated.15 By 
producing at home, it was hoped that there would be a positive 
effect on U.S. balance of payments and the level of domestic 
em ployment.16 
In theory, the desired effects of the DISC legislation are 
achieved by lowering the effective income tax rate to give the DISC 
exporter the opportunity to lower prices, expend more funds on 
export promotion, and thereby increase the demand for exports.17 
With the increased profitability of exporting, there would then be 
a shift of firms and their resources to the exporting industry, which 
in turn would result in a higher number of exports.18 By making 
to be set aside for future tax liability, the isolation of these funds and their lack of produc-
tivity in the production process would arguably make up for any lower effective tax rate. 
In reality, firms behave with the deferred income tax dollars as if they were the result of 
a tax exemption. Accordingly, the Accounting Principles Board advises that, "the contingent 
tax liability [related to _ DISC tax-deferred income] is so remote that it need not even be 
considered in the compilation of annual earnings." Statement of Accounting Principles Board, 
reprinted in Anninger, DISC and GATT: International Trade Aspects of Bringing Deferral 
Home, 13 HARV. INT'L L.J. 391, 404 (1972). 
15. The Committee analyzed the effect of the disparate tax treatment given U.S. 
companies which exported goods abroad and U.S. companies which manufactured 
goods abroad in foreign subsidiaries, as follows: The exporter was discriminated 
against because he paid full U.S. taxes on a· current basis; the U.S. company which 
manufactured abroad through a foreign subsidiary, on the other hand, generally 
was required to pay only the foreign taxes on its income on a current basis. Foreign 
taxes were found by the committee to average about 10 percentage points less 
than the regular U.S. corporate income tax. The committee also found that the 
existing tax structure encouraged the reinvestment of foreign earnings of foreign 
subsidiaries in plants or selling organizations located abroad, since this enabled 
the parent corporation to postpone the payment of the U.S. tax which would result 
if the foreign earnings were remitted to the United States. The DISC provisions 
of the bill were designed to remove the U.S. exporter's disadvantage by freeing 
him from U.S. tax as long as he continued to use export income in production 
facilities, to the extent the facilities were used to produce goods in the U.S. for 
sales abroad. 
Joint Committee Print, supra note 11, at 9. 
16. Id. 
17. Comment, The DISC Legislation as a Violation of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade, 41 Mo. L. REV. 180, 185 (1976). 
18. Id. at 186. Traditional microeconomic theory predicts that in industries where short 
run influences create excess economic profits, firms in industries facing long run equilibrium 
and zero economic profits will be drawn to investing resources at the higher return. Once 
a greater number of firms develop in the industry with the higher asset returns, output 
will expand, prices will fall, and excess profits will dissipate in the long run thereby limiting 
the expanding industry's growth. The result, therefore, is the long run expansion of the 
targeted industry. 
In the DISC case, the lower effective tax rate creates excess economic profits which 
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it as profitable to have a manufacturing subsidiary based in the 
United States as abroad, the tax deferral increases the demand for 
the domestically produced product.19 
To qualify as a DISC and receive this favorable tax treatment, 
a corporation must meet several requirements: (1) the DISC must 
be incorporated in the United States;20 (2) it must have issued only 
one class of stock with a stated value of at least $2,500.00;21 (3) it 
must have elected to be treated as a DISC;22 (4) ninety-five percent 
of its gross receipts must be derived from exports;23 and (5) ninety-
five percent of its assets must be export related.24 
A DISC may act as a principal or as an agent with respect to 
export property.25 Its activities can be performed for or on behalf 
of related or unrelated parties.26 There is also no requirement for 
attract entry into the targeted export sector. This creates a greater output of the export 
good, a new lower price for the export good, and an expansion in the quantity of exports 
demanded. Under competitive market conditions, this is an export tax incentive. For fur-
ther explanation, see w. NICHOLSON' MICRO ECONOMIC THEORY: BASIC PRINCIPLES AND EXTEN-
SIONS 291-307 (2d ed. 1978). 
19. Comment, supra note 15, at 186. The reference to making production "just as 
profitable" at home as abroad is in reference to tax incidence alone. The analysis in the 
text accompanying notes 17-19'is one which holds all other factors besides tax rate con-
stant for the predicted result. Under DISC, the "just as profitable" language refers to the 
existence of a U.S. based export firm which is itself tax exempt and whose dividends are 
only taxed to the parent stock owner when distributed. This immediate tax scheme is that 
which is currently in place for export firms based abroad, owned by U.S. based corporations. 
20. 26 U.S.C. § 992(a)(l) (1982). 
21. Id. § 992(aXl)(c). 
22. Id. § 992(aXl)(D). 
23. Id. § 992(aXl)(A). The gross receipts test requires that at least 95% of the 
corporation's gross receipts consist of qualified export receipts. In general, qualified export 
receipts are receipts, including commission receipts,•derived from the sale or lease for use 
outside of the United States of export property, Id. § 993(a)(l)(A), or from the furnishing 
of services related or subsidiary to the sale or lease of export property. Id. § 993(a)(l)(C). 
Dividends on stock of related foreign export corporations and interest on any obligation 
which is a qualified export asset are also considered qualified export receipts. Id. § 993(aX1XE). 
Export property must be manufactured, produced, grown, or extracted in the United States. 
Exports subsidized by the U.S. government or exports intended for ultimate use in the United 
States do not qualify as export property. Id. § 993(aX2). A DISC may not engage in manufac-
turing, producing, growing or extracting export property. Id. § 993(c)(l)(A). 
24. Qualified export related assets include inventories of export property, necessary 
operational equipment and supplies, trade receivables from export sales (including commis-
sions receivable), producer's loans, working capital, investments in related foreign export 
corporations, obligations of domestic corporations organized solely to finance export sales 
under guaranty agreements with the Export-Import Bank, and obligations issued, guaranteed 
or insured by the Export-Import Bank or the Foreign Credit Association. Id. § 992(a)(l)(B). 
25. Statement by Reagan Administration, General Explanation of Current Law-DISC, 
reprinted in 20 TAX NOTES (CCH) No. 3, at 240 (June 18, 1983). 
26. Id. 
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a DISC to have employees or real operation.27 Conversely, the DISC 
itself is prohibited from producing the exports it sells.28 
The size of the DISC benefit a parent corporation or 
shareholder receives is dependent in major part upon two factors: 
the amount of export income allocated to the tax exempt entity from 
the parent;29 and the portion of the taxable DISC income that is 
required to be distributed back to the parent.30 DISC income alloca-
tion is determined either on an "arm's-length"31 basis or under one 
of two special pricing rules.32 Specifically, an allocation can be made 
allowing the DISC to earn taxable income not exceeding the greater 
of: 
a. taxable income based upon the price actually charged the DISC 
by its supplier, if that price is justifiable under section 482 pricing 
regulations;33 
b. four percent of the qualified export receipts attributable to the 
sale of export property plus 10% of the related export promotion 
expenses, which are the ordinary and necessary expenses incurred 
to obtain qualified export receipts;34 or 
c. fifty percent of the combined taxable income of the DISC and 
its related supplier attributable to qualified export receipts plus 
10% of the related export promotion expenses.35 
In terms of the portion of DISC income that is distributed, the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) determines the parent's tax liabil-
ity in the following manner. Using the DISC's average gross receipts 
27. Id. 
28. Id. See 26 U.S.C. § 993(c)(l)(A) (1982). See also Anninger, DISC and GATT: Interna-
tional Trade Aspects of Bringing Deferral Home, 13 HARV. INT'L L.J. 391 (1972). 
29. This is the intercompany transfer provision defined at 26 U.S.C. § 994 (1982). 
Theoretically, the parent desires to allocate as much income as possible to the DISC in order 
to decrease its own tax base and increase the DISC's. This is achieved by charging as low 
a price as possible to the DISC for goods to be sold for export. Under the DISC provisions, 
this occurs through the choice of the transfer price rule which allocates the greatest amount 
of total export receipts to the DISC. 
30. This is the distribution requirement for DISC shareholders defined at 26 U.S.C. 
§ 995 (1982). See infra text accompanying notes 36-38. 
31. "Arm's-length" refers to a transfer price between two related entities which is 
theoretically equal to that price which would be charged for the same good between unrelated 
parties. It is a standard which related U.S. tax payers are required to follow or else face 
reallocation by the IRS under § 482. 26 U.S.C. § 482 (1982). 
32. Id. § 994(a)(l) & (a)(2). 
33. Id. § 994(a)(3). 
34. Id. § 994(a)(l). 
35. Id. § 994(a)(2). 
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over a four year base period, the excess of the current year's 
receipts over 67% of the average gross is calculated.36 Fifty-seven 
and a half percent of the excess is deemed distributed to the DISC's 
shareholders and is taxed to the parent corporation or individual 
at the normal rate.37 The remaining 42.5% is retained by the DISC 
and is exempt from taxation.38 
Since 1971, the DISC provisions have been altered by the Tax 
Reduction Act of 1975,39 the Tax Reform Act of 197640 and the Tax 
Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA).41 The Tax 
Reduction Act denied DISC benefits to profits arising from exports 
of products in short domestic supply .42 The 1975 Act also removed 
DISC benefits from exports of natural resource products, such as 
oil, gas, and minerals, subject to the percentage depletion 
allowance.43 The Tax Reform Act excluded renewable resources, 
36. Id. § 995(e)(3). 
37. Id. § 291(a)(4). 
38. Id. These provisions for the calculation of DISC income distribution and deferral 
are appropriately referred to as the "incremental provisions." See infra text accompanying 
notes 45-46. Their purpose is to ensure that only by increasing exports will firms increase 
their DISC benefits past the first year of election. 
To understand this incremental concept, the use of a simplifying example is perhaps 
best. If a DISC, in operation, say, since 1971 were to calculate its distribution and deferral 
for 1980, it would first calculate an average base period figure using the fourth, fifth, sixth 
and seventh calendar years preceding 1980. Thus, the base period figure would be the average 
of export receipts for years 1974 through 1977. For simplicity, this amount will be $162 ($75 
+ $150 + $200 + $225 I 4). 
Using this ngure of $162 as the average gross receipts base, the excess of the 1980 figure 
over 67% of the base is calculated. For 1980, a gross receipts amount of $400 will be chosen 
to provide a contrast for our example. Thus, for the hypothetical DISC in 1980, receipts in excess 
of 67% of the base are $291. Under the distribution rules, $167 ($291 x .575) would be deemed 
distributed to the parent (provided the DISC is a wholly owned subsidiary) and $124 ($291 x .425) 
would be income retained by the DISC as tax exempt deferred income. 
Suppose, however, this DISC had a higher base average, reflecting a lesser export receipts 
increase for 1980. Using a base of $294 ($225 + $275 + $325 + $350), the receipts in excess 
of 67% of the base would be $203. Distribution would then be $117 to the parent with only $86 
for the DISC tax free as a deferral. Clearly, the example illustrates that the absolute level of DISC 
receipts is not as significant as the relationship of gross receipts to the base period average. Thus, 
the conclusion is consistent with the incremental rule's purpose: only by increasing current export 
receipts can DISC benefits increase. As parent corporations wish to increase DISC benefits, 
they must not maintain their current level of exports, they must increase it. From the firm's 
viewpoint, this is the incentive to export. 
39. Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12, Title VI,§ 603, 89 Stat. 26, 64 (1975). 
40. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, Title XI, § 1101, 90 Stat. 1520, 1655 
(1976). 
41. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, Title II, § 
204(a), 96 Stat. 324, 423 (1982). 
42. 26 U.S.C. § 993(c)(3) (1982). 
43. Id. § 993(c)(2)(C). 
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such as timber, from the natural resource products ineligible for 
DISC benefits.44 The 1976 Act also included incremental provisions 
limiting DISC benefits to increases in exports above a certain base 
period.45 The incremental provisions were enacted in order to ensure 
DISC benefits were perpetuated only as a result of increased 
exports.46 In 1982, TEFRA increased the deemed distribution rate 
from a DISC to a corporate shareholder from 50% to 57.5% of tax-
able income. 47 
Based on the foregoing, the real value of DISC benefits is 
perhaps somewhat hidden.48 Clearly, regardless whether income 
becomes tax exempt when retained by the DISC, it is still of little 
use to the parent or stockholder if it is taxed at the full rate when 
distributed.49 Moreover, if the income cannot be used for produc-
tion by the DISC, even the DISC's tax exempt status is arguably 
of little value.50 The law, however, permits the DISC to loan its tax 
exempt profits to the parent or related firm if such firm is itself 
substantially engaged in export activities.51 Herein lies the 
mechanism by which the parent firm can productively utilize the 
tax benefits so seemingly valueless to the DISC itself as a paper 
corporation.52 Very simply, the more income allocated to the DISC, 
the greater the amount of tax exempt DISC income available for 
low interest "producer loans" to the parent, and the greater the 
incentive to produce and sell abroad. 
B. DISC AND GATT: A HISTORY OF CONTROVERSY 
Ever since its conception in 1970, DISC has been· the topic of 
heated debate.53 Of primary concern in this debate have been the 
44. Tax Reform Act of 1976, supra note 40, at 60. 
45. Tax Reform Act of 1976, supra note 40, at 1655. 
46. Joint Committee Print, supra note 11, at 13-14. Under the incremental approach, 
deferral is only granted to the extent of 42.5% of a company's current income attributable 
to increases in its exports over 67% of a 4 year average base amount. See also note 38. 
47. 26 U.S.C. § 291(a)(4) (1982). 
48. See generally, Brumbaugh, DISC: Effects, Issues, and Proposed Replacements, Con-
gressional Research Service, Apr. 5, 1983, Rpt. No. 83-69E, 5-6. 
49. Outside of deemed distributions, any declared dividends by DISCs are also sub-
ject to full taxation for the shareholder. 26 U.S.C. § 995(a) (1982). 
50. Recall discussion of § 993(c)(l)(A), supra text accompanying notes 27-28. 
51. 26 u.s.c. § 993(d) (1982). 
52. Brumbaugh, supra note 48, at 5. 
53. See Summary of arguments against DISC proposed by S. Surrey, Hearings on 
Amendments 925 and 1009 to H.R. 175520 Before the Senate Committee on Finance, 91st Cong., 
2d Sess., pt. I, 37, 43-44 (1970). See also Brown, Slipped DISC, FORBES, Oct. 10, 1983, 158; 
J.H. Jackson, The Jurisprudence of International Trade: The DISC Case in Catt, 72(4) AM. 
J. lNT'L L. 747, 750-51 (1978); T. Kwako, Tax Incentives for Exports, Permissible and Proscribed: 
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repeated allegations of Canada and the EC that DISC is an export 
subsidy illegal under GATT.54 In response, the United States has 
consistently argued that DISC is not an illegal subsidy under GATT 
but merely a tax deferral which is justifiable as a provision to 
neutralize the export subsidies inherent in certain European tax 
systems.55 
An Analysis of the Corporate Income Tax Implications of the MTA Subsidies Code, 12(3) 
LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 677, 686-714 (1980). 
54. See United States Tax Legislation (DISC), Report of the Panel, supra note 2, at 102. 
55. Id. For a clear picture of the U.S. position before the GATT Council, the following 
excerpt from a letter by Roy T. Englert, Acting General Counsel, U.S. Department of State, 
to Hon. Wilbur D. Mills, Chairman, House Committee on Ways and Means is representative: 
Dear Mr. Chairman: At the presentation before the Ways and Means Com-
mittee by the Treasury of its proposal for a domestic international sales corpora-
tion (DISC) on May 12, 1970, it was requested that the Committee be furnished 
with an opinion as to the compatibility of the DISC proposal with the obligations 
of the United States under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 
The pertinent provision of the GATT is Article XVI:4. That Article provides 
in part as follows: 
" ... from 1January1958 or the earliest practicable date thereafter, contracting 
parties shall cease to grant either directly or indirectly any form of subsidy on 
the export of any product other than a primary product which subsidy results in 
the sale of such product for export at a price lower than the comparable price 
charged for the like product to buyers in the domestic market .... " 
Thus, the DISC proposal would be inconsistent with the obligations of the 
United States under the GATT only if that proposal involved the granting of a 
subsidy and the subsidy would result in the sale of products for export at a price 
lower than the comparable price in the domestic market. 
The GATT working Party on Subsidies of November 19, 1960 (BISD, 9th Supp., 
Geneva, 1961) issued a report which, at page 185, sets forth a list of practices which 
would constitute a subsidy within the meaning of Article XVI:4, including the "ex-
emption in respect to exported goods, of charges or taxes, other than ... indirect 
taxes" and the "remission, calculated in relation to exports, of direct taxes ... 
on industrial or commercial enterprises." 
The DISC proposal involves neither the direct granting of a subsidy, the remis-
sion of direct taxes, nor an exemption from direct taxes. The essence of the DISC 
proposal is that United States tax on the export income derived through such a 
corporation, like the United States tax on income of a foreign subsidiary, would 
be deferred until distribution to shareholders, at which time the distribution would 
be taxed at regular rates. 
Therefore, after having considered the provisions of Article XVl:4, official 
statements and reports regarding that Article, the internationally accepted past 
and present practices of various countries which are also bound by the provisions 
of that Article, and having considered in addition the provisions of the United States 
Internal Revenue Code for the taxation of income of foreign corporations, and having 
regard also for other relevant factors, I am pleased to advise you that, in my opin-
ion, the DISC proposal, as presented to the Committee, is consistent with the obliga-
tions of the United States under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 
Anninger, supra note 28 at, 393-95 n.12. 
See also Jackson, supra note 53, at 760-73; Kwako, International Tax Rules, in U.S. 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY 1981: A DRAFT REPORT 6-28 (G. Hufbauer ed.1982); L. GOMES. 
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1. The European Position 
a. DISC as a subsidy under GATT 
Established in 1946, GATT is a multilateral set of agreements 
designed to advance the principles of free trade.56 While much of 
the free trade thrust of GA TT has been in the direction of lowering 
tariffs, more recent emphasis has been on the removal of nontariff 
barriers such as subsidies.57 It is in the context of subsidies that 
the DISC controversy arises. 
In theory, subsidies such as DISC divert international trade 
flows from their normal pattern and distort producer incentives 
from those determined by comparative advantage.58 Thus, although 
DISC may be beneficial to American interests in isolation, by dis-
torting trade flows in favor of U.S. interests, DISC denies the 
benefits of an objective market mechanism to U.S. trading 
partners-benefits to which they are entitled under GATT.59 
The GATT language prohibiting subsidies is found in article 
XVI, section 4, and comes into play through the fulfillment of two 
conditions: (1) the governmental program must be an export sub-
sidy of a nonprimary product;60 and, (2) the export subsidy must 
be found to result in the export sale of such product for a price 
lower than that charged in the exporter's domestic market.61 While 
the criterion are indeed specific, no definition of subsidy was ever 
included in GATT.62 What had been outlined, however, in 1960, 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, 22-23 (1979). The administration also justified the 1971 
DISC legislation to Congress as a response to European border tax adjustment actions. Hear-
ings on the Nomination of John B. Connally to be Secretary of the Treasury Before the Senate 
Comm. on Finance, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 40 (1971). 
56. Comment, The DISC Legislation as a Violation of the GeneralAgreement on Tariffs 
and Trade, supra note 17, at 180. See J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF THE 
GATT-A LJ::GAL ANALYSIS OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE (1969). 
57. Comment, supra note 17. 
58. Comment, supra note 17, at 181. 
59. Comment, supra note 17, at 181-83. See also the text of GATT article XVI, section A: 
If any contracting party grants or maintains any subsidy, including any form of 
income or price support, which operates directly or indirectly to increase exports 
of any product from, or to reduce imports of any product into, its territory, it shall 
notify the CONTRACTING PARTIES in writing of the extent and nature of the 
subsidization, of the estimated effect of the subsidization on the quantity of the 
affected product or products imported into or exported from its territory and of 
the circumstances making the subsidization necessary. 
GATT, article XVI, supra note 2, at 30. 
60. GATT, article XVI, para. 4, supra note 2, at 31. 
61. Id. 
62. E. McGOVERN, INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION: GATT, THE UNITED STATES AND 
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 251 (1982). The usual reason given for the lack of any definition 
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was a list of specific practices which were generally agreed upon 
to represent subsidies, the existence of which would set up a prima 
facie violation of article XVI. 63 
b. Sections ( c) and ( d) of the 1960 
Working Party Agreement on Subsidies64 
In 1973, a GATT panel was formally initiated to investigate 
whether sections (c) and (d) of the Working Party Agreement on 
Subsidies prohibited direct tax deferrals such as DISC.65 Prompted 
by the complaints of Canada and the EC, the panel sought to deter-
mine whether DISC, which is technically a tax deferral, was of such 
unlimited duration as to amount to a direct tax exemption.66 Upon 
concluding its investigation, the GATT panel agreed with the EC 
and Canada and recommended the GATT Council declare that the 
United States had nullified or impaired the GATT benefits of the 
petitioners.67 
of a subsidy in GATT centers around a recognition that subsidies can come in a greater 
variety of forms than are readily describable by a single definition. By defining subsidy, 
the drafters feared not only that the loopholes created by any definition would be greater 
than the prohibition of the definition itself, but that contracting parties would strictly con-
strue any criterion given in order to severely limit the scope of Article XVI. Instead 
of a definition, the drafters settled for the general language of Article XVI, and the inter-
pretive sections of the GATT Code on Subsidies. See GATT: Agreement on Interpretation 
of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII, supra note 3, at 67-70, 81-83. 
63. See Report on Subsidies, Provisions of Article XVI:4, supra note 3, at 186. 
64. Id. Items (c) and (d) refer respectively to "the remission, calculated in relation to 
exports, of direct taxes ... on industrial or commercial enterprises," and "the exemption, 
in respect of exported goods, of charges or taxes, other than charges in connection with 
importation or indirect taxes levied at one or several stages on the same goods if sold for 
internal consumption." Id. 
65. 28. The representative of the European Communities referred to the il-
lustrative list of measures which governments prepared to accept the Declaration 
giving effect to Article XVI:4-incl-uding the United States Government-
considered in general to be subsidies within the meaning of Article XVI:4 and in 
particular to items (c) and (d) of that list, which referred respectively to "the remis-
sion, calculated in relation to exports, of direct taxes ... on industrial or commer-
cial enterprises," and "the exemption, in respect of exported goods, of charges or 
taxes, other than charges in connection with importation or indirect taxes levied 
at one or several stages on the same goods if sold for internal consumption." 
Report of the GATT Panel, United States Tax Legislation (DISC), supra note 2, at 103. 
66. An unlimited deferral of taxes was, according to the European Communities, 
equivalent in economic terms to an exemption since the deferral granted by the 
DISC legislation was unlimited .... The system, therefore, afforded not a limited 
advantage but total exemption from direct federal corporation taxes for one half 
of the profits of a DISC accruing from exports. 
Report of the GATT Panel, United States Tax Legislation (DISC), supra note 2, at 103. 
67. Report of the GATT Panel, United States Tax Legislation (DISC), supra note 2, 
at 112-14 §§ 67-80. 
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Specifically, the GATT panel argued that because of DISC's 
unlimited existence and potential for indefinite deferral, the tax 
incentive was potentially a partial tax exemption.68 Without reaching 
a conclusion as to this "broader" exemption issue, however, the 
panel chose to base its primary objection to DISC on a narrower 
finding that because no interest was charged on the deferred tax, 
this interest forgiveness was itself a subsidy.69 The panel also faulted 
the DISC program's deduction for export promotion expenses70 and 
the less than strict adherence to arm's-length pricing with the 4% 
and 50% rules discussed earlier.11 On this latter ground, the panel 
concluded that given the various options under the DISC legisla-
tion for the allocation of profits from export sales between manufac-
turers and DISC's, there was too much leeway for abuse in 
measuring the amount of the DISC incentive.72 
2. The U.S. Position 
From the U.S. perspective, DISC is technically a deferral and 
therefore not simultaneously an exemption.73 Moreover, DISC is 
equally justifiable as a countermeasure to EC tax export 
incentives.74 This section will focus on the justification the United 
States presented for DISC to the GA TT Council. 
a. DISC as a means of removing an existing distortion 
rather than creating a new distortion in international 
trade 
The DISC panel was one of four GA TT panels commissioned 
in 1973 to investigate the issue of tax export aids.75 While the DISC 
panel was instigated by the EC and Canada, the United States 
similarly won an examination of the French, Belgian and Dutch tax-
ation systems on charges they also provided export incentives illegal 
68. Id. at 113 § 71. 
69. Id. at 113 § 69. 
70. Id. at 114 § 76. 
71. Id. at 114 § 79. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. at 104 § 31. See supra note 55. 
74. Report of the Panel, United States Tax Legislation (DISC), supra note 2, at 106 
§§ 39-42. 
75. The other three GATT panels were, by title of final report: Income Tax Practices 
Maintained by France, Report of the Panel, GATT Doc. L/4423 (12 Nov. 1976); Income Tax 
Practices Maintained by Belgium, Report of the Panel, GATT Doc. L/4424 (12 Nov. 1976); 
Income Tax Practices Maintained by the Netherlands, Report of the Panel, GATT Doc. L/4425 
(12 Nov. 1976). 
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under GATT.76 From the U.S. perspective, the territorial systems 
of these major EC nations were designed to allow parent corpora-
tions to shift large amounts of domestic source income to foreign 
subsidiaries which were both untaxed domestically and often 
incorporated in low tax countries.77 Whereas the EC systems allowed 
such profits to be repatriated almost tax free, the systems 
guaranteed the parent the fruits of any allocation of domestic profits 
to the foreign entity.78 The root of the problem, the United States 
argued, was the nonenforcement of arm's-length intercompany 
pricing rules to ensure only profits derived abroad would receive 
preferential tax treatment.79 
As a result of the inherent nature of the EC tax systems to 
promote exports, and the flexibility of EC intercompany pricing 
rules, the United States alleged it was justified in maintaining 
DISC.80 With "approximate" arm's-length pricing standards, DISC 
merely brings U.S. intercompany pricing rules closer in line with 
those in effect in Europe.81 Therefore, as a U.S. tax export aid, DISC 
is justifiable as a means of neutralizing already existing tax breaks 
76. Id. See E. McGOVERN, supra note 62, at 254. 
77. Report of the Panel, United States Tax Legislation (DISC), supra note 2, at 106 § 40. 
78. Id. In clear contrast to the relaxed nature of European corporate tax practices 
are those of many states within the United States. Unlike the European territorial systems 
which promote overseas transactions and investment, many states within the United States 
have adopted "unitary business/formula apportionment" methods of taxation aimed at tax-
ing the multinational income of instate corporations. This is a very direct method of discourag-
ing overseas operation because of the added tax burden and fears of double taxation. In 
contrast to this state practice is the Federal Internal Revenue Code which taxes income 
from foreign subsidiaries only to the extent it is remitted to the United States in the form 
of corporate dividends. For further background into the contrast of United States and 
European taxation of multinational income see the recent U.S. Supreme Court case of 
Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Board, 456 U.S. 960, rehearing denied, 104 S.Ct. 365 (1983), 
in which a unitary method, like that just described, was upheld against a constitutional 
challenge. 
79. Report of the GATT Panel, United States Tax Legislation (DISC), supra note 2, 
at 106 § 40. The use of arm's-length pricing is important to undistorted trade flows under 
a territorial tax system because of the incentive to export which can arise through its absence. 
If a producer knows that profits repatriated from overseas subsidiaries are tax free, while 
those from domestic transactions are taxed at a normal rate, clearly the effect is to pro-
mote export transactions through the foreign subsidiary. With the aid of intercompany price 
manipulation, the parent can maximize the favorable result of the foreign tax rules by 
charging the subsidiary an at cost price for the good produced at home, so that no taxable 
profits accrue to the parent. Then, when the foreign subsidiary resells for export, its low 
cost basis in the transaction yields an amount equal to not only its normal profit, but the 
parent's as well. The subsidiary then repatriates the parent's portion, which is tax free to 
both itself and the parent. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. at 105 § 38. 
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provided to EC producers through intercompany pricing rules and 
territorial taxation.82 
The panels found that arm's-length pricing would indeed be 
a logical solution, and that EC practices clearly strayed from this 
standard in many instances.83 There was not, however, an inherent 
flaw in territorial tax systems which would render them GATT 
illegal.84 On the contrary, as long as arm's-length standards are 
observed, territorial systems are a GATT legal means for avoiding 
international double taxation.85 As for the U.S. justification, the 
panels concluded any alleged EC distortions were better remedied 
by a GATT standard of arm's-length pricing, rather than a posture 
of mutually offsetting distortions on both sides of the Atlantic.86 
3. The Current Status of the Controversy 
In adopting the panel findings discussed above, the GA TT Coun-
cil issued a statement of understanding reached between the 
opposing parties which set out three criteria for judging the legality 
of tax export aids.87 Briefly, the council concluded that (1) the GATT 
treaty will not be interpreted to require signatories to tax economic 
processes taking place outside the territorial limits of an exporting 
country;88 (2) article XVI (4) will be interpreted to require arm's-
length prices in connection with the taxation of export transactions;89 
and, (3) GATT will not be interpreted as a prohibition on the adop-
tion of measures designed to prevent the double taxation of export 
earnings. 90 
Since 1981, the GATT Council's findings have been interpreted 
to conclude DISC is a violation of the General Agreement.91 The 
United States, however, has consistently maintained that DISC is 
GATT legal, mainly in light of the Council's ruling that foreign 
82. Id. at 105 § 38, 106-07 §§ 39-42. 
83. See GATT panel reports on European tax systems, supra note 75. See also E. 
McGOVERN, supra note 62, at 255. 
84. E. McGOVERN, supra note 62, at 255. 
85. Id. 
86. Report of the Panel, United States Tax Legislation, (DISC) supra note 2, at 114 § 79. 
87. December 1981 Statement of Understanding, Report accompanying adoption of the 
GATT p.anel reports, reprinted in 16 TAX NOTES (CCH) No. 3, at 269 (July 19, 1982). 
88. Id. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. 
91. DISC Again Under Attack Before the GATT Council, 16 TAX NOTES (CCH) No. 1, 
at 81 (July 5, 1982). 
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source income need not be taxed directly to comply with GATT.92 
Despite the consistent denial of GATT illegality, the United States 
acknowledged in October 1982 that due to the height of the DISC 
controversy, an attempt would be made to develop a DISC 
substitute.93 In defense of the decision to seek a DISC substitute, 
Treasury Secretary Regan wrote the GATT Council that the U.S. 
initiative was taken because "the view held by many of the GA TT 
members that the U.S. is not abiding by GATT rules seriously com-
promises the ability of the United States to use the GATT to defend 
its trade interests."94 
The U.S. initiative came into public view in August 1983 with 
the introduction of H.R. 3810, the Foreign Sales Corporation Act 
of 1983.95 The proposal, however, received scant consideration in 
the Senate and none in the House before the end of the first ses-
92. Statement of the Deputy U.S. Trade Representative, David R. McDonald, before 
the GATT Council, June 29, 1982, reprinted in 16 TAX NOTES (CCH) No. 3, at 269 (July 19, 
1982). Specifically, the United States argued that although the question whether the tax 
deferral equalled a GATT illegal exemption was originally the issue, with the release granted 
by the GATT Council allowing tax exemptions for foreign source income, DISC, which did 
no more than this, was legitimized. DISC, the United States stressed, did no more than defer 
tax on foreign source income, as such income is defined under applicable United States law. 
The Europeans rejected this analysis outright as a clear manipulation of terms. To 
the EC, foreign source income was not synonomous with all monies received from abroad. 
Rather, foreign source income was income derived from foreign economic processes-
processes which a DISC, as a domestic corporation, could not perform. Therefore, from the 
European perspective, the foreign economic processes requirement exempting foreign source 
income from mandatory direct taxation did little to help defend the United States' position. 
93. Over the past several years, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) has undertaken a detailed examination of the provisions designed to pro-
mote exports through DISCs to determine if they are in conformity with the GATT 
rules governing export subsidies. Although the United States has vigorously defend-
ed DISC, a general consensus has developed among GATT member countries that 
the DISC is inconsistent with the GATT and that the United States should bring 
its tax practices into compliance with these rules. The view held by many of the 
GATT members that the United States is not abiding by GATT rules seriously 
compromises the ability of the United States to use the GATT to defend its trade 
interests. Accordingly, the Administration believes that the United States should 
respect the GATT consensus and attempt to comply with it. 
The Treasury Department is now examining various alternatives to the DISC. 
Any alternative must be GATT legal and promote sound international economic 
policy. A specific legislative proposal will be developed in the context of the fiscal 
year 1984 budget process. 
Letter from U.S. Treasury Secretary Donald T. Regan to the GATT Council, reprinted in 
17 TAX NOTES (CCH) No. 9, at 708 (Nov. 29, 1982). 
94. Id. 
95. H.R. 3810, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. H6580-81 (1983). See supra note 1. 
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sion of the 98th Congress.96 During the second session, S.1804 was 
the topic of a Senate Finance Committee hearing on February 3, 
1984.97 At that time, Senator Dole declared FSC would be a part 
of the omnibus tax bill expected to be reported out of the Finance 
Committee on or before April 1, 1984.98 
On March 21, 1984, FSC was reported out of the Senate Com-
mittee on Finance as a part of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984.9aa 
Although not a part of the House tax bill for 1984, FSC was main-
tained as part of the Deficit Reduction Act when passed by the 
Senate on May 17, 1984.98h Amended slightly in conference,9ac FSC 
was finally adopted by both Senate and House Conferees on Satur-
day, June 23, 1984, and passed by both houses on June 27, 1984.98d 
The complete 1984 tax bill, including FSC and repeal of DISC, was 
signed into law by President Reagan on July 18, 1984.9ae 
While responses to FSC have been mixed, the EC has yet 
to stop its calls for a GATT working party to assess monetary 
damages for the EC countries allegedly injured as a result of 
DISC.99 The United States has repeatedly denounced such at-
tempts to force a monetary settlement for DISC and has warned 
that such attacks are counterproductive and likely to result 
96. The only consideration FSC received before the end of the 98th Congress, 1st Ses-
sion, was a brief hearing on Friday, November 18, 1983. Hearing reprint is yet unavailable. 
Witnesses at the hearing included: The Honorable Juan Luis, Governor U.S. Virgin Islands; 
Evan A. Werling, Vice President, Finance, French Oil Mill Machinery Company, Piqua, Ohio, 
on Behalf of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, Washington, D.C.; Glen W. 
White, Director of Taxes, Dow Chemical Company, on Behalf of Chemical Manufacturers 
Association, Washington, D.C.; Michael Fayhee, McDermott, Will & Emery, Chicago, Ill., 
accompanied by Alfred DeGregory, Vice President, Finance, California Almond Growers 
Exchange, Sacramento, Calif., on Behalf of the National Council of Farm Cooperatives, 
Washington, D.C.; Ron Joranko, Director of Taxes, TRW, Incorporated, Arlington, Va., 
accompanied by Robert Ragland, Director of Taxation, National Association of Manufacturers, 
Washington, D.C. 
97. Finance Panel to Include FSC Proposal in Tax Bill, DAILY TAX REPORT (BNA) No. 
24, at LL-1 (Feb. 6, 1984). 
98. Id. 
98a. See supra note 1. 
98b. Id. 
98c. Id. 
98d. Washington Post, June 28, 1984, at Al, col. 5. 
98e. See supra note 1. 
99. Prior to enactment see, European Community Renews its Call for DISC Damages 
Study at the GATT, 19 U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No.10, at 363 (June 7, 1983); U.S. Takes 
Strong Defensive Stance Against EC Attack on DISC at GATT 20 U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) 
No. 2, at 50 (Oct. 11, 1983). Subsequent to enactment see, Washington Post, July 12, 1984, 
at D6, col. 6. 
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in turning Congress away from dealing objectively with the 
DISC situation.100 
III. THE FOREIGN SALES CORPORATION 
ACT OF 1983 (FSC) 
A. A TECHNICAL/THEORETICAL DESCRIPTION 
As a GATT legal substitute for DISC, FSC is conceptually 
grounded on the GATT Council's pronouncement releasing signa-
tories from any obligation to tax the foreign economic processes 
of domestic firms. 101 In form, therefore, FSC is to be incorporated 
abroad and actually possess the presence with which to generate 
the income receiving U.S. tax exemption.102 In this way, the pro-
posal conforms the alleged propensity of DISC to subsidize U.S. 
producers through a potentially indefinite deferral on certain 
domestic source income.103 
Like DISC, FSC is a tax incentive to export. Unlike DISC, 
however, FSC works through a 100% repatriated dividends deduc-
tion for FSC corporate parents104 and a limited corporate income 
tax exemption for the FSC itself.105 For dividends declared from 
a portion of the FSC income also exempted from U.S. direct 
taxation, 106 the dividends received deduction ensures that no level 
of U.S. corporate tax is imposed on a portion of FSC income.107 
Therefore, within the limits set by the proposal, the more exporting 
a parent does through an FSC, the more tax exempt income, and 
the lower the combined effective tax rate on export transactions. 
To qualify as an FSC, a corporation must have its shares held 
by no more than twenty-five persons, 108 and satisfy both the foreign 
presence and foreign economic processes requirements. In terms 
of foreign presence, an FSC must (1) maintain an office outside U.S. 
territory;109 (2) maintain a summary of its permanent books of 
100. See 19, 20 U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA), supra note 99. 
101. Reference is to criteria (1) for judging the GATT legality of tax export aids prom-
ulgated by the GATT Council upon the adoption of the DISC panel report. See Report on 
Acceptance of Panel Reports, supra note 87. 
102. 26 U.S.C. §§ 923, 924 (West Supp. 1985). 
103. See supra text accompanying notes 64-69. 
104. 26 U .S.C. § 245(c) (West Supp. 1985). 
105. Id. § 923. 
106. Id. § 926. 
107. Joint Committee Print, supra note 11, at 26. 
108. 26 U.S.C. § 922(a)(l)(B) (West Supp. 1985). 
109. Id. § 922(a)(l)(D)(i). The specific requirement is to maintain an office, and under 
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account at its foreign office;110 (3) have at least one director who 
is resident outside the United States;111 and, (5) be incorporated out-
side the United States.112 
In connection with income earned by an FSC, the following 
foreign economic processes must be evidenced by the FSC itself. 
First, the FSC must participate in the solicitation, the registration 
or the making of any contract related to a transaction from which 
an FSC will be assigned income.113 This test is met if either the FSC, 
or anyone under contract with it, performs one or more of these 
three activities outside the United States.114 
Second, the FSC must fulfill the foreign direct cost- total direct 
cost ratio.115 Under this test, the foreign direct costs of an FSC, 
attributable to any transaction from which an FSC will be assigned 
income, must meet the 50% 116 or 85% foreign direct cost 
requirement.117 
Under both ratios, direct costs are related to the costs incurred 
for: (1) advertising and sales promotion;118 (2) the processing of 
customer orders and the arranging for delivery of the export 
property;119 (3) transportation from the time of acquisition by the 
FSC to the delivery to the customers;120 (4) the determination and 
transmittal of a final invoice or statement of account and the receipt 
of payment;121 and, (5) the assumption of credit risk.122 
§ 922(aK1KAKi) to be incorporated, see infra note 113, in a country which has either an exchange 
of information treaty pursuant to § 274(h)(6)(C), or an income tax treaty with the United 
States. 26 U.S.C. §§ 922(a)(l)(A)(i), 274(hK6)(C) (West Supp. 1985). See also Id. § 927(e)(3). 
110. A complete set of books and records must also be kept available in the United 
States for U.S. tax administration and enforcement. 26 U.S.C. § 922(a)(l)(D)(ii-iii) (West Supp. 
1985). 
111. id. § 922(a)(l)(E). 
112. Incorporation in either Guam, the Virgin Islands, the Commonwealth of the 
Northern Marianas or American Samoa is also acceptable. Id. § 927(d)(5). As discussed in 
note 109 supra, the intention is that a foreign country, to be eligible for FSC incorporation, 
not be a country that has a law denying U.S. officials access to the corporate records of 
companies owned by U.S. citizens. This explains the need for an exchange of information 
or tax treaty pursuant to § 927(e)(3). Id. § 927(eK3). For further discussion see, 130 CONG. 
REC. 46636 pt. II (daily ed. June 22, 1984) [hereinafter cited as 1984 Tax Conference Report]. 
113. 26 U.S.C. § 924(d)(l), (d)(l)(A) (West Supp. 1985). 
114. Id. See Joint Committee Print, supra note 11, at 29. 
115. 26 U.S.C. § 924(d)(l)(B), & (2) (West Supp. 1985). 
116. Id. § 924(d)(l)(B). 
117. Id. § 924(d)(2). 
118. Id. § 924(e)(l). 
119. Id. § 924(e)(2). 
120. Id. § 924(e)(3). 
121. Id. § 924(e)(4). 
122. Id. § 924(e)(5). 
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In relation to the 50% requirement, the ratio of direct costs 
incurred abroad to the total direct costs for the transaction must 
be at least 50%.123 In relation to the 85% requirement, the ratio 
of any two of the direct costs outlined above, when performed 
abroad, to the total direct costs for the transaction must be at least 
85%.124 
For an FSC that satisfies the above requirements, both the 
FSC and its U.S. parent are eligible for a limited U.S. tax exemp-
tion on a portion of their income from export sales. The calcula-
tion of this benefit is the result of a two step process. First, the 
FSC's net export earnings125 are calculated based on either (a) the 
arm's-length cost of the export good;126 (b) a portion of the FSC's 
foreign trading gross receipts;121 or, (c) an allocation of the FSC's 
and the parent's combined export income.128 Second, the FSC's tax 
exempt income129 is calculated to correspond to that income which 
is directly traceable to the FSC's foreign economic processes.130 The 
former figure is the primary basis upon which tax exempt dividends 
are declared and repatriated to the U.S. parent.131 Only after ex-
hausting this source can the FSC distribute its own tax exempt 
earnings.132 
The FSC's net export earnings, or foreign trading income,133 
is the income generated from the FSC's foreign trading gross 
receipts.134 Generally, foreign trading gross receipts are gross 
receipts from the sale or lease of property outside the United 
States.135 From this gross receipts figure, FSC net export earnings 
123. Id. § 924(d)(l)(B). 
124. Id. § 924(d)(2). 
125. These net export earnings correspond to the FSC's foreign trade income from 
foreign trading gross receipts. Id. §§ 923(b), 924. 
126. Id. § 925(a)(3). 
127. Foreign trading gross receipts are defined at Id. § 924; transfer-price-income-
allocation rules are defined at Id. § 925(a)(l). 
128. Id. § 925(a)(2). 
129. This figure corresponds to Id. § 923 entitled "exempt foreign trading income." 
130. Id. § 921. 
131. Id. § 927(c). 
132. Id. § 926(a). 
133. Id. § 923(b). 
134. Id. 
135. Foreign trading gross receipts are gross receipts from: 
(a) the sale, exchange, or other disposition of export property; 
(b) the lease or rental of export property that is used by the lessee outside the 
United States; 
(c) the performance of services that are related and subsidiary to the sale, exchange, 
lease, rental or other disposition of export property by the FSC; 
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are calculated as either (a) the balance left after subtracting an 
arm's-length transfer price for the export goods bought from the 
parent;136 (b) 23% of the combined taxable income of the FSC and 
its parent;137 or, (c) 1.83% of the FSC's foreign trading gross 
receipts,1388 but not more than 46% of the combined taxable income of 
the FSC and the parent.138b 
Method (a) represents the conforming section to the GA TT pro-
nouncement on arm's-length pricing between related parties.139 
Methods (b) and (c), however, are administrative pricing rules 
designed to approximate an arm's-length transaction where one is 
not easily distinguished.140 
Once the FSC's net export earnings are calculated, the second 
step, as outlined above,141 is to calculate that portion of the FSC's 
net export earnings which is directly traceable to the FSC's foreign 
economic processes. This portion of the net export earnings is called 
tax exempt foreign trading income,142 and is calculated by a method 
dependent upon the transfer pricing method used to calculate the 
net earnings figure. If an arm's-length price was used, 32% of the 
net earnings become tax exempt.143 If an administrative pricing rule 
was used, the tax exempt net earnings are either 16% of the com-
(d) the performance of engineering or architectural services for construction pro-
jects located outside the United States; and 
(e) the performance of managerial services in furtherance of the production of foreign 
export trading gross receipts. 
Id. § 924. The provision for managerial services, § 924(a)(5), was qualified in Conference to 
include the following limitation: "Paragraph (5) [related to managerial services] shall not 
apply to a FSC for any taxable year unless at least 50 percent of its gross receipts for such 
taxable year is from activities described in paragraph (1), (2) or (3) [(a), (b) and (c) above].'' 
Although the intent of this change from the original Act is not expressly written in the 
conference report, the impact is clearly to add greater substance to the FSC foreign presence. 
In this way, the Conference amendment acts to bring FSC more closely in line with the GATT 
foreign economic processes requirement. See supra note 87 and text accompanying supra 
note 89. 
136. Id. § 925(a)(3). 
137. Id. § 925(a)(2). 
138a. Id. § 925(a)(l). 
138b. Id. § 925(d). 
139. Joint Committee Print, supra note 11, at 30. 
140. Id. In order to use the administrative pricing rules, an FSC must meet two re-
quirements. First, all of the activities which fall into the category of direct costs under § 
924(e) must be performed abroad by the FSC. Second, all the activities related to the 
negotiating and making the contract for the export sale must be performed abroad by the 
FSC. 26 U.S.C. §§ 924, 925 (West Supp. 1985). 
141. See supra text accompanying notes 133-38b. 
142. 26 U.S.C. § 923 (West Supp. 1985). 
143. Id. § 923(a)(2). 
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bined income of the parent and the FSC144 or 1.27% of the FSC's 
gross sales up to 3% of FSC income.145 
Finally, the parent's benefit comes through the repatriation 
of FSC net earnings in the form of tax exempt dividends.146 While 
the FSC is free to declare dividends from all net export earnings -
those possessing as well as those lacking tax exempt status on the 
FSC level- distributions are treated as being made first out of the 
nonexempt earnings and then out of the exempt category .147 Thus, 
there is no corporate level tax on exempt FSC net earnings whether 
retained or distributed, and only a single-level corporate tax on net 
earnings other than the exempt variety .148 
B. SMALL BUSINESS EXCEPTIONS 
In order to provide relief for small businesses who may find 
the foreign presence and economic process requirements burden-
some, the DISC replacement legislation provides two alternatives 
to FSC: the interest charge DISC149 and the small FSC.150 The 
premise of each option is that for small exporters, the benefits of 
FSC are outweighed by the costly foreign presence requirements. 
Thus, without these alternatives, such exporters would curtail 
export promotion.1503 
1. The Interest Charge DISC 
Any previously or newly qualified DISC151 with ten million 
dollars or less in qualified export receipts152 may continue, under 
the DISC replacement legislation, to operate as a DISC and defer 
tax liability on that limited portion of its income.153 Three major 
144. Id. § 923(a)(3). 
145. Id. See 1984 Tax Conference Report, supra note 113, at H6636. 
146. 26 U.S.C. § 926 (West Supp. 1985). 
147. Id. § 926(a). 
148. Joint Committee Print, supra note 11, at 32. 
149. 26 U.S.C. § 995(f) (West Supp. 1985). 
150. Id. § 924(b)(2). 
150a. See 1984 Tax Conference Report, supra note 113, at H6636. 
151. Interest charge DISCs will be administered under the same sections of the IRC, 
with minor amendments, as are current DISCs. 26 U.S.C. §§ 991-996 (West Supp. 1985). Thus, 
qualification as an interest charge DISC is primarily the same as qualification as a DISC 
today. The GATT legality of the DISC is technically provided for with the interest charge. 
In reality, however, because concern over DISC is centered mainly around large corporate 
exporters, small DISCs with $10,000 or less in qualified exports receipts are expected to 
be ignored for purposes of the debate over a GA TT legal substitute for DISC. 
152. Id. § 995(b)(l)(E). 
153. Id. 
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changes, however, accompany this new DISC. First, all deemed 
distributions relating to base period exports (the incremental rule) 
and to one-half of the DISC's income have been eliminated.154 Second, 
an interest charge on the DISC shareholders' deferred tax liability 
will now be collected on an annual basis.155 The rate to be charged 
is to be based on the average investment yield of fifty-two week 
T-bills.156 Third, any qualified export receipts in excess of the ten 
million dollar limit will be deemed distributed to DISC shareholders 
and fully taxed.157 
2. The Small FSC 
A small FSC is identical to the FSC described above with two 
exceptions. First, it may only receive favorable tax treatment on 
five million dollars or less of its foreign trading gross receipts.158 
Second, it will be exempt from the foreign management and foreign 
economic process requirements.159 Any income above the five million 
dollar limit does not qualify as foreign trading gross receipts and 
is directly included in the FSC's U.S. tax base.160 
C. CURRENTLY DEFERRED DISC INCOME 
A simple but major provision of the FSC proposal is a tax 
forgiveness provision for previously deferred DISC income.161 As 
of January 1, 1985, any accumulated DISC income will be treated 
as previously taxed income for purposes of any future tax liability .162 
154. 1984 Tax Conference Report, supra note 113, at H6512, section 802(a)(l). 
155. 26 U.S.C. § 995(f) (West Supp. 1985). 
156. Id. 
157. Id. § 995(b)(l)(E). 
158. Id. § 924(b)(2)(B)(i). 
159. Id. § 924(b)(2)(A). 
160. Id. § 921(d). 
161. 1984 Tax Conference Report, supra note 113, at H6513, section 804(5)(2). 
162. Id. The international and domestic legal implications of DISC deferred tax 
forgiveness are arguably much more significant than the practical effects. As stated in the 
text accompanying notes 196-202, the inclusion of a deferred tax forgiveness provision is 
arguably an admission that DISC was an export subsidy all along. This is not the most 
favorable conclusion considering the United States consistently defended DISC and as a GATT 
legal temporary deferral. 
To the current DISC user, the forgiveness provision, while absolutely essential, is 
nonetheless what had been expected- not to mention what DISC users had been led to believe 
by the Treasury Department all along. While there is no question the very large accumulated 
deferrals of some major corporations, such as Boeing Corp., could cause bankruptcies if they 
were deemed currently due, DISC users were led to believe this would never occur. 
First, no interest charge on the deferred amount is contrary to usual IRS procedure 
concerning deferral or currently non-recognized tax liability. One could argue that the lack 
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IV. ANALYSIS 
A. FSC AND GATT 
The basic question of an FSC's GA TT legality is best studied 
from two inter-related perspectives. One is strict GA TT legality: 
does FSC comply with the strict legal rules of GATT? The other 
is "GATT-ability": will FSC buy peace with our European trading 
partners?163 These two terms often co-exist, but with the EC 
majority in GATT, the second is arguably the most telling.164 In fact, 
given the structure of GATT investigatory procedures, if a con-
tracting party does not actually challenge a DISC substitute, no 
investigation of it would be made.165 Thus, under a standard of 
of diligence shown by Congress and the IRS to keep track of deferred income in constant 
dollars and save the present value revenue loss through interest payments is strong evidence 
Congress had already written off deferred DISC income. Second, the accepted accounting 
practice of not taking deferred DISC tax liability into account for computing current net 
income is misleading to investors, as well as overstates income, if that liability were not 
understood by corporate directors and accountants to be as good as forgiven. Finally, and 
most persuasive, is the existence of such huge accumulated corporate deferrals in and amongst 
themselves. If Congress expected to end the DISC program anytime soon without a 
forgiveness provision, it is highly unlikely these amounts would have been allowed to accrue. 
Declaring them suddenly due would be tantamount to declaring bankruptcy for many DISC 
users, if not serious financial ruin. Certainly it is easy to say these entities brought this 
on themselves, but the reality still exists and no Congress could ignore the implications 
of such an action. 
Thus, while DISC deferred tax forgiveness is a thorn in future U.S./GATT relations 
with the EC and Canada, the reaction of domestic producers is clearly one of less than com-
plete surprise. 
163. The terms "GATT legal" and "GA TT-able" are those used by the author in Field, 
A.dministration Proposes DISC Replacement Plan, 18 TAX NOTES (CCH)No. ll,at977-78(Mar. 
14, 1983). They are particularly relevant because they describe the unique forces at work 
within the GATT Council. While there are clear standards of GATT legality, the United 
States must also be aware of the sensitivities of the European based majority. No doubt 
GATT legality is an avowed precedent-but there is clear evidence within the DISC con-
troversy that portrays the EC as particularly preoccupied with defeating DISC regardless 
of the reasonableness of any U.S. justification put forth. See e.g., U.S. Defense of DISC Before 
GATT, 16 TAX NOTES (CCH) No. 3, at 269 (July 19, 1982), contrasted with the initial EC 
response found in DISC Again Under Attack Before GATT Council, 16 TAX NOTES (CCH) No. 
l, at 81 (July 5, 1982). This theme of the need for both GATT legality and GATT-ability 
is developed further in the text following this note. 
164. To see the extent to which the United States has gone to appease the Europeans 
on the DISC issue, and similarly to restore U.S. credibility before the GATT Council, see 
supra note 93, and the letter by Secretary Regan to the GATT Council. 
165. As it relates to subsidies and the GATT, Article XVI declares that only "upon 
request" will discussions with the alleged subsidizing government take place. They do not 
automatically occur through an ongoing monitoring of CONTRACTING PARTY practices. 
See GATT, article XVI, supra note 2, at A60. For further explanation of the GATT dispute 
resolution procedures, see K. DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZA-
TION (1970). 
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"GATT-ability," it should not be surprising that what is GATT 
illegal may be able to pass GATT muster-if it is acceptable from 
the European perspective.166 
1. The Foreign Economic Processes Requirement161 
Conceptually, a system which offers domestic income tax 
exemptions in proportion to the level of a firm's foreign economic 
processes is clearly both GATT legal and GATT-able.168 An FSC, 
therefore, with its foreign economic processes and presence re-
quirements, is conceptually unassailable. Whether the level and 
breadth of the foreign activity required, however, is proportional 
to the proposal's alleged net foreign source income component, is 
another question entirely .169 
It is difficult to accurately generalize the active ingredients 
of one percentage of income generation. It is a task, however, which 
must be satisfactorily accomplished in order to determine the 
GATT legality of FSC.110 Under an FSC transaction at arm's-length, 
166. Here the scenario would involve an EC practice that was arguably GATT illegal 
but to which the U.S. response was retaliation in a non-GATT-sensitive manner instead of 
a complaint before the GATT Council. The reverse situation is also possible, of course. It 
is worth adding at this point that while reference here is made primarily to the EC, the 
EC majority, and to the United States, the conclusion to be drawn is not that these are 
the only parties to the GATT. However, from the perspective of the DISC controversy, 
these, as well as Canada, are the primary players. 
167. "Requirement" refers to the GATT pronouncement on giving direct tax exemp-
tions only in proportion to the level of foreign economic processes. This requirement is derived 
from the first criteria adopted by the GATT Council upon the acceptance of the GATT panel 
reports: The GATT treaty will not be interpreted to require signatories to tax economic 
processes taking place outside the territorial limits of an exporting country. See GATT Acts 
on Export Aid Panel Reports, 13 TAX NOTES (CCH) No. 24, at 1485 (Dec. 14, 1981). See also E. 
McGOVERN, supra note 62, at 255. Thus, if the United States wishes to give direct tax exemp-
tions to stimulate exports in the form of FSC, there must be a foreign economic process 
requirement to comply with GATT. 
168. This conclusion is drawn from the first criteria adopted by the GA TT Council upon 
the acceptance of the DISC panel report. Acceptance of the DISC panel report was given 
conditionally upon: 
the understanding that with respect to these cases (DISC, etc ... .) and in general, 
economic processes (including transactions involving exported goods) located out-
side the territorial limits of the exporting country need not be subject to taxation 
by the exporting country and should not be regarded as export activities in terms 
of Article XVl(4) of the General Agreement. 
Statement of GATT Council, December 1, 1981, reprinted in E. McGOVERN. supra note 62, 
at 255. 
169. The contrast here is between what is conceptually required for direct tax exemp-
tions to be used as tax exports aids and what the physical manifestations of these concep-
tual requirements are within the DISC replacement legislation. 
170. See supra notes 168-69. 
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the proposal exempts 32% of the net foreign trade income from 
U.S. direct taxation. The issue, therefore, is whether an over one-
third profit allocation for an FSC's "watered-down" disposition func-
tion is a justifiable proportion.171 
While no definitive answer to this question is offered, a 
reasonable starting point might be to say that the question is con-
tingent upon the type of operation to which such a scheme is applied. 
Take, for example, a fully integrated parent corporation, which 
exports exclusively through a foreign subsidiary .172 Based on an 
arm's-length transaction,173 the parent receives its full domestic 
mark-up, through the sale to the subsidiary, before the product hits 
the foreign market.174 The domestic source side of the transaction 
is complete. 
Similarly, for the foreign subsidiary which has paid the arm's-
length price for the product it will sell abroad, any "resale" mark-
up the subsidiary attaches must be equated to some value it has 
added for the transaction to clear under competitive market 
conditions.175 Such is the origin of a foreign source income 
component. 
171. The one third profit allocation alluded to here refers to the 32% tax exemption 
for FSC foreign trade income based on an arm's-length transaction. 26 U.S.C. § 923(a)(2) (West 
Supp. 1985). In terms of disposition functions, the label "watered-down" is applied because 
only either the 50% or 85% rules for foreign direct costs associated with disposition need 
to be followed to claim the 32% exemption. Id. § 924(d). For further detailed explanation 
see infra text accompanying notes 101-48. 
172. A fully integrated parent would be one where all vertical levels of production are 
operated by the parent itself. In other words, from collection of resources to packaging for 
shippin·g, the parent operates as one unit and performs all functions. 
173. For definition see supra note 31. 
17 4. The following example will illustrate this type of transaction. As an integrated 
producer, the parent produces a good at cost X. X represents almost a pure input cost as 
all levels of production are internal to the parent. In other words, X does not contain any 
profit-taking by outside intermediate producers. On top of X, the parent adds, say, a 20% 
mark-up. The cost, therefore, on an arm's-length basis for the foreign sales subsidiary, is 
X + .2X = Y. Domestic source profits equal the parent's net income (Y - X) = .2X. The 
cost basis for the subsidiary becomes Y. Bear in mind that this is somewhat simplified in 
terms of actual cost breakdown. 
175. The concept here is much simpler than it appears. Based on the example, supra 
note 174, if the foreign sales subsidiary has cost Y, which is an arm's-length transfer price, 
that will be the open market price for the good's resale unless the value of the product 
is increased by the subsidiary. "Increasing the product's value" means that for a foreign 
consumer, the good is worth more than the domestic transfer price Y. This is due to many 
factors such as unavailability except by export, transportation and distribution costs, as 
well as foreign office overhead. Export goods consumers, therefore, perceive the good's price 
in relation to these added costs. For the foreign sales subsidiary, the new or resale cost 
is Y + Z, where Z is transportation and disposition costs, including foreign office overhead. 
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What complicates any analogy from this conceptually simple 
scenario to the working of an FSC is that an FSC is not technically 
equivalent to a strict independent foreign subsidiary. In a strict 
parent/independent-subsidiary transaction, it is likely no substan-
tive activity to complete the foreign sale occurs from the domestic 
side once the parent releases ownership of the good to the 
subsidiary.176 With an FSC, however, this assumption is somewhat 
altered. Under the 50% and 85% rules, 177 only those percentages 
of what would be 100% foreign disposition costs for a strict indepen-
dent subsidiary are the actual FSC costs incurred abroad. In other 
words, where all the costs attributable to a foreign subsidiary's 
resale are undertaken abroad in the strict independent subsidiary 
example, under FSC, the same profits accrue, with only an effec-
tive 50% foreign disposition cost requirement.178 It is, therefore, 
only from this 50% foreign-incurred disposition cost that foreign 
source income can be derived.179 Those percentages of income from 
Add to this the subsidiary's mark-up, say 5%, then final foreign consumer cost is (Y + Z) 
+ .05 (Y + Z), or P x (export price). Under competitive market conditions, P xis the cost to foreign 
consumers. The foreign source net income component, or that derived from foreign economic 
processes, is .05Z. Remember that since Y is the price paid for a good produced in the U.S., 
it yields domestic source income. The figure .05Y, however, is still net income to the foreign 
sales subsidiary. 
176. Such a relationship would be where the foreign subsidiary performed 100% of the 
disposition function abroad and incurred all such costs after paying the arm's-length price. 
Referring again to the scenario described supra notes 174-75, the point is that Z represents 
costs incurred abroad solely by the foreign subsidiary. 
177. For explanation see supra text accompanying notes 115-24. 
178. Again, referring to the example, supra notes 17 4-76, where the foreign source net 
income component is .05Z, the assumption was that the foreign subsidiary would incur cost 
Z completely as a foreign direct cost. Thus the 5% mark-up was attributable to foreign in-
curred costs up to the fraction of total cost: Z I (Y + Z). Under FSC, however, Z is not 100% 
foreign direct costs, but rather only 50%. Thus, .05 (.5Z) is the real foreign source net in-
come component. The essential point being that .05 (.5Z), the residual, is a further domestic 
source component because up to that percentage of Z can be performed from the United 
States. In complete form, our example yields the following results: P x = (Yd + Zr + Zd) + 
.05 (Yd + Zr + Zd), where Zr and Zd represent costs incurred abroad and in the United States, 
respectively, both chargeable to the FSC and equal to .5Z. 
179. See supra note 178. It is important before proceeding, that the GATT interpreta-
tion of the terms domestic and foreign source net income are clearly understood. Under the 
FSC proposal and the GATT pronouncement on foreign economic processes, see supra notes 
168-69, domestic source income, which is not eligible for direct tax exemption under the 
GATT, is that which is derived from domestic economic processes. Foreign source income 
is that which is derived from foreign economic processes. The critical point of understand-
ing is that costs paid with monies from abroad are not costs of foreign economic processes 
unless the activity actually occurs abroad. Thus, even though a good is sold abroad and paid 
for with monies from abroad, that is not foreign source income unless the income is derived 
in connection with some sort of foreign value added. 
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the export sale attributable to the cost of the domestically produced 
product and the parent's disposition functions are not considered 
derived from foreign economic processes.180 
Based on the 50% figure derived above, if the cost breakdown 
of the product being sold is 85% for the product itself and 15% 
for disposition, transportation and overhead, the net per transac-
tion FSC foreign source income component is 7 .5%, while the 
domestic source component is 92.50/o.181 
Returning, then, to the question of an FSC's exemption in rela-
tion to the substance of the required foreign economic processes, 
the GATT requirement of proportionality is clearly violated in cases 
such as those illustrated above. If the 32% exemption is compared 
to the 7 .5% foreign source net income component, the proposal can 
arguably result in an exemption which is at the least 77% domestic 
source income.182 Under a set of operating circumstances like those 
described above, it appears that FSC can produce an exemption 
which is out of line with the GATT foreign economic processes 
requirement. 
Perhaps even more troublesome, though, to the GATT legality 
of FSC is the calculation of the cost breakdown that would be 
required to render a particular parent-FSC relationship GATT 
legal. For the FSC 32% direct tax exemption to be 100%, as opposed 
to 23% foreign source, foreign disposition costs under the 50% 
direct cost election would have to be a least 64% of the export sales 
180. See supra note 179. 
181. Adding a final step to the example derived supra notes 174-78, if we substitute 
85% for Y and 15% for Z (7.5%Zd and 7.5%Zr), the result is that 92.5% (85% + 7.5%) of the 
.05 mark-up figure is derived from domestic economic processes and 7.5% is derived from 
foreign economic processes. 
Recapping the complete example with the terminology of the FSC, the corresponding 
figures evolve. Foreign trading income is calculated to be .05 (Yd + Zr + Zd), while exempt 
foreign trading income equals 32% of this figure. In foreign and domestic source terms, 
and using the 85% / 15% split outlined above, at most 23% of the 32% exemption is really 
an exemption based on foreign economic processes, while at least 77% is an exemption bas-
ed on domestic economic processes (23% = .05(Zr) I .32 (.05 (Yd + Zr + Zd)]). 
The results of this example are based on a 1:1 cost-profit generation ratio. Given 
cost accounting assumptions, this is not an erroneous figure. Also, the example assumes 
that Z, which is intended to correspond to 26 U.S.C. § 924(e) (West Supp. 1985) activities, 
is representative of the only costs of the FSC. Clearly there are foreign presence costs which 
are not subject to the 50% split. Even if they were to be included in the example, however, 
at most the results would be changed to an 80% I 20% cost split and an exemption made 
of 31 % (.05(10) /.32 (.05 (80 + 10 + 10))) foreign source and 69% domestic source income-
still way out of proportion. 
182. See supra note 181. 
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price.183 Such a scenario would then allow the parent's transfer price 
to represent no more than 36% of the export price.184 While this 
may be possible in the absence of an arm's-length standard, it 
appears highly unlikely that with arm's-length pricing the price or 
value of the good sold would be less than half the amount of the 
final export price185 - particularly given the limited foreign disposi-
tion cost component called for under the FSC proposal.1858 
While FSC is not per se GATT illegal, the situations under 
which the economic processes requirement are met appear remote 
at best. While FSC is clearly conceptually GATT legal, the prac-
tical consequences of the proposal appear to strain any notion of 
strict GATT legality or GATT-ability. 
2. The Interest Charge DISC and Small FSC Exceptions 
a. Interest Charge DISC186 
The findings of the GATT panel on DISC pointed directly to 
the lack of any interest charge on a DISC shareholder's deferred 
tax liability as a form of illegal subsidy .187 It would seem reasonable 
to conclude, therefore, that an interest charge DISC would appease 
European concerns. While the logic of such a conclusion is clear, 
it is still doubtful that an interest charge DISC is either GATT legal 
or, more importantly, GATT-able. 
The GATT panel on DISC, while resting its decree of non-
compliance on the absence of an interest charge, set out to 
investigate the legality of DISC's potentially unlimited tax 
183. Using the formula outlined in note 182 supra, the value of Zr needed to make the 
32% exemption 100% foreign source is 32%. If this is not intuitively correct, 100% = .05(32) 
I .32[.05(36 + 32 + 32)). Then, given the 50% foreign direct cost proportion requirement 
explained in note 178 supra, total foreign direct cost must account for 64% of the export 
profit or net income (.05(36 + 64) = 1.8 + 3.2 = 5; 3.2 / 5 = 64%). 
184. If Zr + Zd = 64%, then Yd must equal 36% where 100% of the profit equals .05 (Yd 
+ Zr + Zd). See notes 17 4-83 supra for any lost steps in this analysis. 
185. See supra text accompanying notes 116-25. 
185a. As described in note 79 supra, under a system which allows transfer price 
manipulation, a parent could charge a sufficiently low transfer price to the foreign subsidiary 
so that a disproportionately large amount of the final export price appears to correspond 
to a foreign source component. Under such a system, it would be possible to have a 64% 
foreign source component on paper. For the reasons outlined in note 79 supra and accompa-
nying text, under an arm's-length standard and the FSC foreign cost requirement, it is not 
likely. 
186. 26 U.S.C. § 995(b)(l)(E) (West Supp. 1985). 
187. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text. 
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deferral.188 On this latter ground, the EC had alleged the unlimited 
deferral to be equivalent to a permanent direct tax exemption.189 
Direct tax exemptions, calculated in relation to exports, are illegal 
subsidies under GA TT .190 The issue necessarily arises, therefore, 
that given the tax forgiveness provision for past DISC deferrals 
under FSC,191 what is the chance interest charge DISCs are also 
destined to be direct tax exemptions? 
While no one knows whether future DISC forgiveness is in the 
offing, a logical European concern would be that while technically 
a deferral, the odds favor interest charge DISCs someday becoming 
exemptions. Moreover, looking to the demonstrated reality of DISC 
utilization, producers who set up DISCs operate undeniably on the 
assumption that deferrals will never be recognized.192 A single look 
at the balance sheets of corporations such as Boeing do not reveal 
their multi-million dollar deferrals listed as payables.193 
The conclusion, therefore, is that while the United States may 
have been previously able to redesign DISC as a legitimate tax 
deferral, now, with the forgiveness provision, no country is going 
to reject what it always "knew" to be true: DISC is and always 
will be an exemption. While the United States may downplay the 
interest charge DISC as an insignificant exception, the anger of the 
EC over the FSC forgiveness provision is likely to carry over to 
any attempt by the United States to create a GATT legal DISC. 
In terms of GATT-ability, if not GATT legality, DISC is a dirty 
word. 
188. Id. 
189. Id. 
190. See Report of Working Party on Provisions of Article XVl:4, supra note 3, at 50. 
See also Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII, supra 
note 3, at 70. 
191. 1984 Tax Conference Report, supra note 113, at H6513, section 804. 
192. See Statement of Accounting Principles Board, reprinted in Anninger, supra note 
28, at 404: "the contingent tax liability (related to DISC tax-deferred income) is so remote 
that it need not even be considered in the compilation of annual earnings." 
In a letter of May 8, 1984 from 18 Washington Trade associations to Rep. Rostenkowski 
(D-Ill.), Chairman, House Committee on Ways and Means, it was stated that: 
DISC-generated investments were made on the basis of assurances by successive 
administrations that the DISC deferrals were intended to continue indefinitely so 
long as invested in export assets ... . To tax these deferrals retroactively would 
unjustifiably penalize U.S. exporters who in good faith liave followed the require-
ment of the DISC statute over the years. 
Prospects Uncertain on Foreign Sales Corporation Provision, 23 TAX NOTES (CCH) No. 4, at 
823 (May 21, 1984). 
193. BOEING CORPORATION, 1982 ANNUAL REPORT 10 (1983). 
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b. The Small FSC 
One possible explanation for allowing this blatantly GATT 
illegal exception centers on the likely low volume of trade it will 
foster in relation to the vast number of producers for which it will 
be unavailable. To paraphrase one source, because the EC only com-
plained about the large exporters using DISCs, the little-man's 
exception should be acceptable.194 Why then the exception? Such 
statements belie the small-FSC-supporters argument. If it is such 
an inconsequential addition, why risk acceptance of the proposal 
to include a small FSC? 
Clearly, the existence of strong support for the small FSC 
stems from the not so inconsequential lobby that won its inclusion. 
There may be, therefore, a well placed group waiting in the wings 
to utilize this provision. A pre-emptive challenge may be made to 
the small FSC unless the United States can convince the EC of the 
insignificance of this provision. GA TT legality no; in this case, 
however, if the United States can win GATT-ability, it may be 
enough. 
3. The DISC Deferred Tax Forgiveness Provision 
Besides the strictly GATT legal issues of the FSC transfer 
pricing195 and foreign activities requirements, 196 there is one issue 
of GATT-ability which could create a problem potentially more 
significant than any of the GATT legal issues already anticipated: 
What to do with the deferred taxes on existing DISCs.197 To the 
EC, treating this deferred tax as forgiven, as FSC does, would be 
an admission that DISC was a subsidy all along.198 United States' 
credibility would be severely tarnished.199 Even if FSC is found ac-
ceptable, there may be an attempt by the EC in the GATT Council 
to collect the entire amount as compensation to injured EC 
producers.200 Thus, the United States could be inviting an even more 
194. See supra note 192. 
195. See supra text accompanying notes 87-90. 
196. Id. 
197. Tax deferred income on existing DISCs is estimated for 1981, the latest year 
available, to be $3.6 billion. 1983 TREASURY REPORT ON DISC 21. 
198. Brown; supra note 53, at 158. 
199. Id. 
200. EC members in GA TT are already attempting to create a working party just to 
access damages to their domestic producers due to DISC. Given this hotly debated issue, 
a move to redirect that cry toward forgiven DISC income would not be an unexpected step. 
See supra notes 100-01. 
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bitter debate than it presently faces over the legality of DISC. The 
move toward forgiveness might even stall future debate of U.S. pro-
posals aimed at protecting American markets from any degree of 
EC subsidy. Ironically, avoiding such a situation was the very reason 
the United States compromised and decided to present a DISC 
alternative. 201 
B. FSC AS A MEANS OF OFFSETTING 
EXISTING EC TRANSFER PRICE PRACTICES 
During the discussion on DISC above, it was stated that 
because of DISC's "approximate" arm's-length pricing rules, DISC 
was a justifiable countermeasure to the lack of rigor with which 
arm's-length pricing is enforced and practiced in the EC.202 It is 
arguable, therefore, that unless FSC can similarly aid in neutralizing 
the preferential treatment of EC intercompany pricing, without 
DISC, there will be a net export incentive advantage in favor of 
the EC.203 Is FSC an effective neutralizer in the sense just described? 
The answer to this question is an unqualified "no." FSC is based 
squarely on arm's-length principles.204 The administrative pricing 
rules contain an upper limit which is below what could conceivably 
pass under a strict arm's-length standard.205 In terms of enforce-
ment, the U.S. Internal Revenue Service is ready, willing and 
specifically empowered to set aside transactions which fail to com-
ly with section 482.206 It seems doubtful, then, that FSC is capable 
of hiding domestic profits in transfer prices so as to make them 
part of FSC income. Without DISC, therefore, the EC retains an 
unmet export incentive advantage. 
201. See letter from Treasury Secretary Regan to the GATT Council, supra note 93. 
202. See supra text accompanying notes 73-86. 
203. Id. 
204. Joint Committee Print, supra note 11, at 30. 
205. 26 U.S.C. § 925 (West Supp. 1985). This is due to the heightened cost of using these 
rules. See id. § 925(c). 
206. Id. § 482. Section 482 reads as follows: 
In any case of two or more organizations, trades, or businesses (whether or not 
incorporated, whether or not organized in the United States, and whether or not 
affiliated) owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests, the 
Secretary may distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, deductions, credits, 
or allowances between or among such organizations, trades, or businesses, if he 
determines that such distribution, apportionment, or allocation is necessary in order 
to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any of such organiza-
tions, trades or businesses. 
Id. § 482. 
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C. THE REAL ISSUE IN CONTROVERSY: DISC AS A MEANS OF 
OFFSETTING DISCRIMINATORY BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENTS 
Border tax adjustments are tools of fiscal policy which operate 
to influence trade patterns on the basis of destination rather than 
origin.207 This "destination principle" is a rule of taxation whereby 
goods are taxed according to the destination of the final consumer 
as opposed to the location of the producer.208 To understand the 
significance of this distinction, it is important to realize that GA TT 
has been interpreted to allow the collection and exemption of 
indirect taxes on a destination basis but to disallow the exemption 
of direct income taxes on an origin basis.209 Thus, for countries that 
impose indirect value added taxes (V AT),210 as in the EC, there exists 
the possibility of using indirect tax exemptions to provide export 
incentives on the basis of destination.211 Conversely, in the United 
States, where only direct producer taxes are paid,212 a direct tax 
exemption used to stimulate exports would be clearly illegal under 
GATT.213 
The justification provided by the GATT Council for allowing 
indirect tax exemptions and disallowing direct tax exemptions is 
the belief that the former are not equivalent to subsidies while the 
latter are.214 The usual rationale is that indirect taxes are allegedly 
neutral in international trade as they are paid by consumers after 
the price of the good has been determined competitively by the 
market.215 Therefore, they neither favor nor disadvantage producers 
whose product prices have been competitively determined on the 
world market.216 
Direct tax exemptions, on the other hand, are benefits which 
207. Anninger, supra note 28, at 415. 
208. Id. 
209. Id. at 415-16. 
210. VAT taxes are indirect taxes on consumption paid by the consumer, as opposed 
to direct taxes which are paid on income by producers. The countries of the EC have long 
used VAT taxes, along with other direct schemes. 
211. By exempting certain export transactions from VAT taxes, consumers pay less 
for the good and thereby will demand more. 
212. Direct producer taxes are those paid on gross income. 
213. Direct tax exemptions given to stimulate exports are illegal under GATT Article 
XVI, as interpreted by The Working Party Agreement on Subsidies, supra note 62, unless 
they are in proportion to income generated from foreign economic processes. 
214. Anninger, supra note 28, at 416. 
215. Id. at 416-18. 
216. I~. 
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accrue directly to the producer.211 Direct tax exemptions are 
disallowed because they allow producers to offer goods to the 
market at a price lower than that which would be observed in the 
absence of the exemption.218 In effect, direct tax exemptions distort 
market forces to favor not the most naturally competitive product, 
but the product which has been rendered more competitive by 
means of an artificial price reduction.219 The conclusion, therefore, 
is that banning a direct exemption and allowing a neutral indirect 
exemption is consistent with the overall free trade policy of GATT.220 
Not all theorists, however, agree with this analysis. 
It is now generally accepted by economists, that both direct 
and indirect taxes have cost shifting effects which influence both 
consumers and producers.221 Neither operates in an isolated 
fashion.222 VAT exemptions are partially absorbed by price increases 
to give exporters an added return on export sales as well as a lower 
price in the world market.223 Direct tax costs are actually shifted 
forward to increase producer prices.224 Why a distinction based on 
the relative distorting effects of indirect and direct tax exemptions 
has been allowed to persist in GA TT- to the disadvantage of the 
United States-is the real issue of significance raised by the United 
States in challenging the alleged GATT illegality of DISC.225 
It is important not to mistake this justification for DISC as 
an argument that DISC is legal under GATT. GATT accepts the 
indirect-direct distinction in form.226 As an allegedly permanent 
deferral, DISC is arguably GA TT illegal. DISC, however, remains 
justifiable because contrary to the accepted norm that only direct 
and not indirect taxes are trade distorting, EC VAT exemptions 
produce similar benefits for producers and similar trade distorting 
217. Id. at 416. 
218. Id. 
219. Id. at 418. 
220. Id. 
221. Id. at 416-18. 
222. Id. 
223. Id. 
224. Id. 
225. See Letter from P.S. Peter, Vice President of the General Electric Company in 
Washington, D.C. to Secretary Regan, reprinted in 17 TAX NOTES (CCH) No. 10, at 770-71 
(Dec. 6, 1982). 
226. Reference is to the fact that GATT has been interpreted to allow indirect tax 
exemptions and not direct tax exemptions. See supra notes 210-16 and accompanying text. 
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effects on world trade as DISCs.221 DISC, as a domestic corpora-
tion, is in effect theoretically equivalent to an indirect border tax 
exemption scheme whereby the producer attempts to shift the 
indirect exemption partially inward instead of passing it completely 
on to the purchaser.228 This type of exemption allows th~ producer 
the discretion to sell at a lower price while simultaneously realizing 
a greater per dollar input return than without the exemption.229 
This is the very same discretion afforded under DISC.230 Had 
the United States forced recognition of this issue within the GATT 
Council, instead of abandoning it and DISC, the United States would 
have had the perfect ammunition to gain either an approval of the 
direct or an abandonment of the indirect exemption. The long-
standing advantage of the EC could have been neutralized. Instead, 
with the abandonment of DISC, any leverage the United States ever 
had over a resolution of the indirect-direct controversy is current-
ly dissipated. 
The thrust of this argument is that the GATT indirect-direct 
tax exemption distinction is one of form over substance. Moreover, 
it is a distinction which has been used by the EC in the GATT Coun-
cil to cancel a U.S. incentive which was not a new distortion to trade, 
but rather a countermeasure to already existing EC practices.231 
Without the U.S. DISC, but with the EC VAT exemption system, 
the EC receives a plus to trade unshared by U.S. exporters. Fur-
thermore, by abandoning DISC, the United States has publicly relin-
quished a significant point of contention with the EC. In so doing, 
the United States has signaled a clear retreat from longstanding 
efforts to combat trade distorting practices in the EC. Thus, 
although FSC may help to mend U.S. relations with the GATT Coun-
cil, it is the U.S. abandonment of DISC itself which is perhaps the 
most significant signal to come from the controversy. 
D. FSC AND AMERICAN BUSINESS 
A major debate in the U.S. business community over the enact-
ment of FSC is the size of the actual credit under FSC as compared 
227. Letter from Peter to Regan, supra note 225. 
228. Anninger, supra note 28, at 416-18. 
229. Id. 
230. Because DISC is a tax incentive to producers which operates in the first instance 
to lower the effective tax rate on export transactions, producers can either lower prices 
by the amount of the subsidy, increase per dollar return by the amount of the subsidy or 
any combination of the two. This is the same result as when a producer receives a VAT 
exemption or rebate. 
231. See letter from Peter to Regan, supra note 225. 
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to DISC. In this regard, because FSC is designed to accommodate 
large and small exporters differently, the analysis below will take 
a similar tact. 
1. Probable Effects of FSC on Large Exporters 
Under DISC and FSC, the actual size of a firm's benefit depends 
on the fraction of its total income that can be allocated to the 
subsidiary,232 as well as the fraction of export income that is exempt 
from federal taxation.233 Under DISC, it is estimated that a firm 
can defer the payment of federal taxes on somewhere between 17% 
and 33% of its income.234 If the rate of taxation is assumed to be 
46%, this range of estimates translates into a maximum effective 
tax rate of 38.2% to a minimum of 30.80/o.235 Considering FSC, on 
the other hand, it can be estimated that an individual firm with 
an FSC could exempt a minimum of 17% and a maximum of 7 4% 
of its income from U.S. taxation.236 
It is likely, however, that few firms will fall within the upper 
portion of this range of estimates.237 Under the FSC rules, only firms 
with very low profit margins would be able to exempt a portion 
of income in the upper end of this range.238 Indeed, judging by the 
average profit margin reported for DISC-utilizing manufacturing 
firms in 1981,239 most firms using FSCs would probably be in the 
lower end of this range.240 This is the portion of the range that coin-
cides with parallel figures calculated for the DISC provisions.2403 
It appears, then, that while some firms with FSCs might be able 
to receive larger tax exemptions under FSC, for most larger firms 
the tax benefit should be the same. 
The equality of benefit under both systems, however, is only 
guaranteed where the FSC is located in a low tax country.241 Due 
232. See supra text accompanying notes 29-30; 125-32. 
233. Id. 
234. Brumbaugh, Effect of Administration FSC Proposal on Export Firms, Congressional 
Research Service, reprinted in 21 TAX NOTES (CCHl No. 3, at 255 (Oct. 17, 1983). 
235. Id. 
236. Id. 
237. Id. 
238. Id. 
239. 1983 TREASURY REPORT ON DISC, supra note 198. 
240. Brumbaugh, supra note 234. 
240a. See supra note 234 and accompanying text. 
241. The argument here is that while DISC is incorporated in the United States and 
pays no taxes itself, FSC is incorporated abroad and pays foreign taxes. Thus any net benefit 
would have to include foreign tax liability. A move to increase the level of benefit under 
FSC, therefore, would be to incorporate in a country with a low corporate income tax rate. 
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to foreign incorporation,242 foreign taxes become a major force in 
dampening the benefits under this proposal as compared with 
DISC.243 Moreover, without the foreign tax credit, all foreign taxes 
are fully borne by the FSC and its parent, and cannot be offset 
against a firm's U.S. tax liability.244 In cases of high foreign tax rates, 
it may be more profitable to set up shop abroad and receive the 
100% tax deferral accorded foreign subsidiaries. Similarly, those 
businesses which can feasibly set up FSCs in tax haven countries 
will be inclined to do so, rekindling flames under this hotly debated 
issue. 
Administrative costs of setting up offshore are a second 
dampening effect which will eat into the benefit an FSC can effec-
tively provide compared to DISC.245 In a high volume, low profit 
business, even slight administrative costs may be too much for the 
corporation to afford in relation to the benefits of FSC.246 Produc-
tion abroad may be the only answer in such cases.._ with a resulting 
loss of jobs and investment at home. 
Thus, although the proposal in itself provides comparable 
tax benefits to DISC, due to the complication of now dealing with 
incorporation abroad, foreign administrative costs and an added 
layer of taxation, many firms may find FSC an incentive to pro-
duce abroad and give up exporting domestically produced products 
all together. Such results would clearly be contrary to any of the 
purposes for which DISC was created: increased employment, U.S. 
investment or exports.247 
2. Probable Effects of FSC on Small Exporters 
As discussed above, the FSC proposal contains two exceptions 
that apply to exporting firms that have gross receipts below acer-
tain level.248 The first exception provides that if a company 
establishes an FSC that generates gross receipts of five million 
dollars or less, it need not satisfy the foreign presence 
242. 26 U.S.C. § 922(aXl)(A)(i) (West Supp. 1985). 
243. See supra note 241. 
244. 26 U.S.C. § 901(h) (West Supp. 1985). See id. § 902. 
245. Under DISC, no substance or specific economic processes are required. DISC is 
a paper corporation. FSC, on the other hand, has specific foreign presence and economic 
process requirements. See id. §§ 992, 924(b) & (c), & (e). See also text accompanying notes 
101-24. 
246. Brumbaugh, supra note 234. 
247. See Joint Committee Print, supra note 11, at 3. 
248. See supra text accompanying notes 149-60. 
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requirements.249 For firms that have substantially less than five 
million dollars in gross receipts, the utilization of this provision may 
result in a somewhat smaller tax benefit than that received under 
DISC.250 
The second exception is for DISCs with ten million dollars or 
less in income.251 These "small DISCs" become exempt from the in-
cremental rules that link the DISC benefit with annual increases 
in export sales.252 Small DISCs are able to exempt somewhere 
between 21.3% and 42.5% of their income from taxation based on 
the DISC rules for income allocation and the portion of a DISC's 
income that can be retained tax-exempt.253 
Under the small FSC provisions, it is important to note that 
the size of the probable tax exemption would not be directly af-
fected by the relaxed foreign economic processes requirements. 254 
The FSC exemption for most of these firms, as with other FSCs, 
would amount to the same 17 to 74% range estimated for larger 
FSCs.255 ·Thus, those that are eligible for small fSC status would 
receive approximately the same tax benefit as a large FSC or DISC. 
The critical advantage, therefore, for firms that qualify for the small 
FSC exception is the cost benefit of not having the same economic 
process requirements to dampen the overall level of benefit.256 
For firms that elect to operate as small DISCs, there is another 
element to contend with - one which was not part of the original 
DISC program. Although none of the small DISC's income is deemed 
distributed, there is an added interest charge on the deferred 
amount.257 The actual tax liability of these small DISCs would then 
be the shareholder's taxes on that share of combined corporate 
income not allocated to the DISC, the taxes on any voluntary dis-
tributions from the DISC, and now the added interest charge. 
The size of the tax benefit for interest charge DISCs will vary 
depending on the interest rate of Treasury Bills at a given time.258 
249. 26 U.S.C. § 924(bX2)(B)(i) (West Supp. 1985). See supra text accompanying notes 
158-60. 
250. Brumbaugh, supra note 234. 
251. 26 U.S.C. § 995(bXll(E) (West Supp. 1985). 
252. 1984 Tax Conference Report, supra note 113, at H6512, section 802(a)(l). 
253. Brumbaugh, supra note 234. 
254. Id. 
255. Id. 
256. Id. 
257. 26 U.S.C. § 995(f) (West Supp. 1985). 
258. Id. 
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Thus, to estimate a precise level of tax benefit is not possible. 
However, it is arguable that new-DISC benefits, with the interest 
charge, would be smaller.259 This is because as treasury bill rates 
approach the prevailing market rate of interest, any return received 
on invested DISC deferred income will be theoretically absorbed 
more and more by the interest charge.260 Thus, new DISCs may be 
less of a small exporter's dream than appears on the surface. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Note began by calling FSC a truly ironic solution to the 
current DISC controversy. To understand the nature of this claim, 
it is useful to once again briefly trace the history of the DISC 
controversy. 
Originally, DISC was set up to aid a poor U.S. balance of 
payments and remove taxes as a factor which promoted overseas 
investment.261 The plan, however, had the positive side effect of par-
tially neutralizing two structural, yet GATT legal, distortions con-
tained in EC tax systems which favored the competitiveness of 
EC exports. First was the export incentive created by the indirect 
tax exemption, such as the European VAT.262 Second was the way 
EC tax laws allowed multinational corporations to beneficially 
manipulate transfer prices in order to lower the effective tax rate 
on world wide corporate income.263 
However, because DISC was a domestic corporation which 
received a direct tax benefit calculated in relation to exports, the 
EC seized the opportunity to defeat DISC on an argument of GATT 
illegal form. This argument based on form insulated the EC from 
having to address the substance of the direct-indirect tax and 
transfer pricing controversies DISC so clearly brought to the fore.264 
Thus, the first level of the paradox: while DISC's replacement, 
FSC, is in form arguably GATT legal, in substance the proposal fails 
to address the clear distorting effects of the EC tax systems. 
Similarly, instead of resulting in enforcement of arm's-length pricing 
on both sides of the Atlantic, the proposal merely gives U.S. pro-
ducers a costly, unilateral mandate to seek arm's-length standards. 
259. Brumbaugh, supra note 234. 
260. Id. 
261. See supra notes 12-19 and accompanying text. 
262. See supra notes 208-35 and accompanying text. 
263. See supra notes 73-86 and accompanying text. 
264. See supra notes 208-32 and accompanying text. 
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As a result, trade will be left in an even more distorted position 
than under DISC-all in the name of GATT and freer trade. 
The reason for this outcome is the second level of the paradox. 
In an effort to keep the DISC-GA TT legality issue from spilling 
over into other U.S.-EC discussions, the U.S. Congress, in enacting 
FSC, blanketed international political considerations over the con-
cerns of the businessmen who actually face the distortions of the 
EC's tax systems. The result is a replacement that is less favorable 
than DISC to the large and small businessman, that arguably ex-
ports jobs, and may even once again promote foreign investment.265 
In the long run, these trampled constituencies have no way to regain 
lost ground but to unite behind even greater subsidies or protec-
tion than DISC. Whereas DISC should have been a negotiating chip 
to avert and rectify the long run fears of business about the struc-
tural bias of the European systems, the watered down FSC, while 
representing a short run fix to the U.S.-EC political malaise, may 
eventually cause an even greater upheaval in the American business 
community. 
David James Cichanowicz 
265. See supra notes 232-60 and accompanying text. 
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